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Abstract

DOES MINDFULNESS REDUCE NEGATIVITY BIAS? A POTENTIAL
MECHANISM FOR REDUCED EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
By Laura Kiken, B.A., M.P.H.
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Science at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2009

Major Director: Dr. Natalie J. Shook
Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology

The present research examined if mindfulness reduced negativity bias on
measures of attitude formation and cognitive style, as a potential explanation for the
beneficial effects of mindfulness on emotional disturbance. Two studies were conducted.
Study One was correlational and found that trait mindfulness inversely correlated with
measures of negative cognitive style, and that the latter partially mediated an inverse
association between mindfulness and predisposition to depression and anxiety. Further,
correlations between mindfulness and both positive attitude formation and optimism
hinted at a potential positivity bias. Study Two extended these findings using a
randomized experimental design comparing a mindfulness induction to an unfocused

ix

attention control condition. The mindfulness condition demonstrated a positivity bias in
attitude formation and increased optimism compared to the control condition, but did not
demonstrate bias in attitude generalization. Potential explanations and implications for
emotional disturbance are discussed.

x

CHAPTER 1 Introduction

Mindfulness has been described as a certain attentional quality brought to
moment-by-moment experience (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Cultivating this particular quality of
consciousness is thought to confer mental health benefits (Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson,
2007). Indeed, a substantial body of literature supports the usefulness of mindfulnessbased approaches for preventing or reducing emotional disturbance (cf. Brown, Ryan, &
Creswell, 2007). However, little research has focused on the mechanisms by which
mindfulness may do so. One possibility is that mindfulness may reduce the influence of
biases in cognitive processing. Theories of mental health generally maintain that a
relatively accurate view of reality facilitates psychological adjustment (Leary, 2004), and
many researchers include the terms “unbiased” and “objective” in descriptions of mindful
awareness (Brown et al., 2007; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). For
example, mindfulness “is thought to allow the person to „acknowledge and accept the
situation for what it is‟ … In terms of implicated psychological processes, this seems to
involve reliance less on preconceived ideas, beliefs, and biases and more on paying
attention to all available information” (Bishop, 2002, p. 74). However, there is a lack of
empirical data demonstrating a causal link between mindfulness and reduced bias. The
present research will test this proposed mechanism for benefits of mindfulness,
specifically investigating negativity bias.

1

Mindfulness: An Overview
The concept of mindfulness has roots in Eastern, particularly Buddhist, meditation
practices yet is described as a universally inherent capacity that enhances insight into the
nature of experience and mitigates psychological suffering (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). It has
been conceptualized as a nonjudgmental awareness of and attention to current internal
and external experiences (Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008).
Dismantling this definition, the foundation of mindfulness is sustained attention
(Brown et al., 2007). Moreover, it involves awareness of the direction of attention and
potentially the ability to flexibly switch attention between thoughts or feelings and
present stimuli (Bishop et al., 2004). Bishop and colleagues explain that this
metacognitive process of attention regulation maintains a nonelaborative stance toward
thoughts, feelings and sensations as they occur. If a thought or feeling elaborates past
initial perception of a stimulus, cognitive inhibition can reduce further elaboration. This
inhibition should not be confused with suppression because thoughts and feelings are
acknowledged as they arise. They are simply noticed rather than entertained
automatically. This reduction of mental elaboration facilitates an orientation toward
current experience. Less attention on elaborative thinking should free conscious
resources to process information that is immediate to the present moment (Martin, 1997).
In this way, mindfulness is considered to entail a wider perspective that detects and
integrates information with greater attention, moment by moment.
Willing, receptive observation of information involves an additional feature of
mindfulness: a nondiscriminatory interest in experience, often called acceptance (cf.
2

Bishop et al., 2004; Cardaciotto et al., 2008). Not to be confused with passivity or
resignation, acceptance here reflects an active process of being open to and curious about
all information rather than letting awareness adhere to some limited or judgmental
agenda. All current information and experience is potentially subject to observation.
Some stress that within the traditional notion of mindfulness, this acceptance entails
kindness and compassion (e.g., Grossman, 2008; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Still, it may be best
to view such qualities as distinct correlates of mindfulness to avoid confounding the
construct (Bishop et al., 2004).
Mindfulness can be examined as a trait as it is considered an inherent capacity and
individuals may vary in their general level of mindfulness in everyday functioning (e.g.,
Brown & Ryan, 2003). For example, when eating mindfully, one attends to the various
immediate sensations of the food as if it is novel. Consider an apple. When mindful, one
might first notice its color, shape, size, and texture. Upon biting into it, the apple might
be characterized as crisp or mealy, sweet or bland, and juicy or rather dry. One might
also notice how it feels against the lips, teeth and tongue. When reactions, such as
feelings of pleasure or distaste and thoughts like “this is good (or bad)” occur, they are
observed and noticed as momentary internal phenomena. This process can be contrasted
with mindlessly consuming the apple: being completely preoccupied in other thoughts
without noticing and implicitly assuming that one already knows what an apple is like.
Such a continuum of mindfulness to mindlessness is possible in various everyday
activities and events. Measurements of trait mindfulness attempt to assess where on this
continuum individuals tend to be throughout daily life.
3

Mindfulness also may be investigated as a state or mode into or out of which one
enters (e.g., Bishop et al., 2004) or that can be heightened. From this perspective,
mindfulness is akin to an attentional skill that one can practice and learn to employ, and
that is relatively absent when not employed. Mindfulness meditation is a practice used to
cultivate a mindful state or mode; state measures of mindfulness can be used immediately
after practice to assess the degree to which mindfulness was evoked. It is not yet clear if
and to what degree such practices increase trait mindfulness (Thompson & Waltz, 2007)
although some research suggests that they do (e.g., Shapiro, Oman, Thoresen, Plante, &
Flinders, 2008).
The conceptualization of mindfulness just described should be distinguished from
Langer‟s (1989) conceptualization of mindfulness as the active creation of new
categorizations for or perspectives toward stimuli. Langer‟s conceptualization refers
more to a particular cognitive activity oriented toward external stimuli, rather than a
receptive observation of both internal and external occurrences. There may be some
similarity in terms of being engaged with stimuli as if they were new, which is supported
by moderate (.23-.39) correlations between related subscales of Langer‟s trait
mindfulness scale (Bodner & Langer, 2001) and a measure of trait mindfulness based on
the conceptualization used here (Brown & Ryan, 2003). For this reason it is noteworthy
that Langer has proposed (cf. Langer, 1989) and in some cases found (e.g., Dijikic,
Langer, & Stapleton, 2008) that her conceptualization of mindfulness reduces reliance on
biases. However, both Langer and mindfulness meditation researchers agree that the two
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conceptualizations of mindfulness differ substantially (e.g.,Bishop et al., 2004; Brown et
al., 2007).
Benefits of Mindfulness
Mindfulness has received considerable attention in the clinical literature in terms
of its benefits as part of interventions or particular practices; it also has received some,
albeit much less, attention in other domains of psychology and as an isolated construct
(cf. Baer, 2003; Bishop, 2002; Brown et al., 2007). The extant literature suggests that
mindfulness is beneficial to one‟s well-being. Correlational studies have demonstrated
that measures of trait mindfulness are associated with lower levels of psychological
distress (e.g., depression, anxiety, hostility and stress) and associated with higher levels
of psychological well-being (e.g., positive affect, competence, vitality and life
satisfaction) (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Brown & Ryan, 2003;
Cardaciotto et al., 2008).
The bulk of experimental research has examined the effects of mindfulness
meditation, especially the efficacy of interventions based on such practices. Mindfulness
research gained momentum roughly 25 years ago with the development and evaluation of
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1982). MBSR is a multicomponent, eight-week intervention that teaches mindfulness skills to reduce stress and
improve coping with physical and psychological ailments. Participants learn and practice
mindful attention toward various experiences, such as the qualities of each breath as it
occurs, sensory aspects of eating a common food, and sensations of the body during
yoga. Two meta-analyses (Baer, 2003; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004)
5

indicate that MBSR leads to improvements on various measures of mental and physical
health, with moderate effect sizes.
Additional mindfulness-based treatments have been developed specifically to
address psychological disorders (cf. Brown et al., 2007). Most relevant to the present
work is Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale,
2002). Like MBSR, MBCT centers on mindfulness practices. It also includes aspects of
cognitive therapy (CT; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Growing evidence supports
the efficacy of MBCT for preventing relapse of depression (Baer, 2003; Segal et al.,
2002; Williams, Russell, & Russell, 2008) and its promise for anxiety disorders including
generalized anxiety disorder (Evans et al., 2008; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002, 2007).
Cognitive Theories of Depression and Anxiety
Cognitive theories of depression and anxiety provide a well-established and
clinically relevant framework in which to examine how mindfulness practices may
benefit psychological well-being. Cognitive approaches emphasize negatively biased
cognitive processes as a cause of depression and anxiety. Thus, cognitive therapy
focuses on changing these cognitive biases to alleviate the emotional disorders.
In terms of depression, according to the two major cognitive theories –
hopelessness theory (Abramson, Metalsky & Alloy, 1989) and Beck‟s (1987) theory –
negatively biased cognitive styles increase vulnerability to depression. Using a
prospective design, Alloy and colleagues (2000, 2006) demonstrated that negative
inferential tendencies and dysfunctional attitudes (unrealistic and negatively biased
assumptions about oneself, the world, and the future) predicted onset as well as higher
6

lifetime prevalence of major depressive disorder. Further, a recent review (Garratt,
Ingram, Rand, & Sawalani, 2007) concluded that cognitive changes, such as
improvements in dysfunctional attitudes and attributions, resulting from cognitive therapy
predict improvements in depressive symptoms. It also is important to note that the most
current evidence does not support the depressive realism hypothesis. Depressive realism
contradicts the notion that depressed individuals are negatively biased by contending that
depressed individuals are more realistic than nondepressed individuals. Most research on
this hypothesis has yielded inconsistent findings and has been criticized for using
methods with no objective or reliably agreed upon standard of reality (Ackermann &
DeRubeis, 1991). Thus, to create a more valid test of the depressive realism hypothesis,
Moore and Fresco (2007) evaluated participants‟ accuracy using (a) objectively real
events and causes, and (b) pre-determined rating standards based on multiple, extensively
trained raters who met a high level of inter-rater reliability, thereby limiting rater bias.
Their study found that depressed individuals were less realistic, showing a significant
negativity bias, compared to nondepressed individuals.
Cognitive theories of anxiety disorders also focus on negatively biased cognitive
patterns. Central to such theories is an overestimation of threat based on schemas of
danger that distort information processing (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997). The looming
vulnerability model (LVM; Riskind, 1997; Riskind, Williams, & Joiner, 2006) identifies
a cognitive style that is common in anxiety disorders but unique from depressive
cognition. Looming vulnerability refers to a dynamic sense of a risk that grows rapidly
with time or proximity. This can be an appropriate response if it adjusts proportionately
7

to the actual level of threat, but it becomes dysfunctional the more that it does not
accurately correspond to reality. The looming cognitive style may underlie many
cognitive biases that have been implicated in anxiety, including disproportionate
allocation of attention to threats rather than safety cues, less habituation to feared stimuli,
and interpretations biased toward danger (cf. Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, BakermansKranenburg, & Ijzendoorn, 2007). Further, inducing such biases has been found to cause
anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002).
Although the precise nature of the cognitive biases in depression and anxiety can
differ, it is clear that both disorders involve biases toward negativity. A complementary
finding demonstrated that greater predisposition to both depression and anxiety was
associated with biased learning and attitude formation (Shook, Fazio, & Vasey, 2007).
Specifically, participants who scored higher on depression and anxiety scales
demonstrated poorer learning of positively valenced novel stimuli, whereas there was no
difference in learning of negative stimuli. Thus, individuals who were predisposed to
depression and anxiety had a tendency to form more negative attitudes than positive
attitudes. Thus, an under-appreciation for positive stimuli may underlie both disorders.
In its traditional form, cognitive therapy (CT) aims to weaken the negativity
biases underlying depression and anxiety by changing their roots: an underlying
negatively biased schema (Beck et al., 1979). This approach of schema modification has
been described as an accommodation model of change (Hollon, Evans, & DeRubeis,
1990). It aims to directly alter cognitive content (e.g., through problem solving, testing
the validity of thoughts, and substituting rational beliefs for irrational ones) so it is less
8

negatively biased. Because changes in a schema cannot be measured directly, reduced
biases in attention, attributions, interpretations and attitudes serve as indications of
schema change (Garratt et al., 2007). Thus, a goal of traditional CT often is to restructure
the content of an individual‟s thoughts, so that their beliefs and feelings are less
negatively biased. To achieve this goal, individuals may be encouraged to consider the
validity and necessity of their existing perspectives while also considering alternate
interpretations of experiences and events.
Similar to aspects of CT, MBCT teaches individuals to develop awareness of
thoughts and feelings as impermanent mental events of questionable truth rather than as
necessarily accurate accounts of self or reality. Although the approach of MBCT is
related to that of CT, the focus of MBCT is to adjust the context for mental content
(Teasdale et al., 2002), with less emphasis on changing the nature of that content. That
is, MBCT encourages the reframing of maladaptive mental content (e.g., curiously
observing and acknowledging without engaging or avoiding) without directly trying to
alter it (e.g., modifying irrational beliefs to be more rational). MBCT teaches individuals
to accept and experience their negative beliefs and emotions, but not to dwell on them
and to focus on the present moment. This emphasis on cognitive context over content is
emblematic of theories about mindfulness (e.g., Brown et al., 2007; Hayes, 2004; Shapiro
et al., 2006).
The context-oriented approach of MBCT can be characterized as an activationdeactivation model rather than an accommodation model (Hollon et al., 1990). In the
activation-deactivation model, certain mental contexts prevent recurrent depressive or
9

anxious symptoms by deactivating negatively biased schemas. Recall that in MBCT, a
metacognitive stance reframes how mental information is processed so that it is not
automatically pursued (Scherer-Dickson, 2004). When a trigger – a sad mood or an
anxiety-provoking situation – occurs, then negatively biased reaction patterns can be
recognized and intentionally processed as mental phenomena without necessarily
subscribing to or identifying with them (Segal et al., 2002). This can prevent further
cognitive elaboration on them. Within the activation-deactivation model, this prevents
the continued activation of the biased schema that would otherwise occur by either (a)
automatically following schema-determined thoughts and feelings as usual, or (b)
actively challenging them as may occur in traditional cognitive therapy. By preventing
the continued activation of negatively biased schemas, they may have less impact in the
present. Over time, it is conceivable that their initial activation could be reduced.
Interestingly, this suggests that adjusting mental context can have implications for
cognitive content, even though mental content itself is not the focus in mindfulness-based
approaches such as MBCT. To deactivate a schema, compensatory schemas may be
activated (Hollon et al., 1990). Compensatory schemas provide alternate, more adaptive
skills for dealing with stressors. Mindfulness skills comprise a compensatory schema.
Practicing the metacognitive, present-moment perspective of mindfulness, negatively
biased cognitive patterns can be acknowledged with acceptance while attention can be
redirected toward the actual qualities of each moment as it unfolds (Garratt et al., 2007;
Segal et al., 2002; Sherer-Dickson, 2004). This suggests that cognition would be less
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occupied with negatively biased thoughts and more focused on openly noticing aspects of
what is actually occurring, such as the details of one‟s sensations or environment.
Consistent with this approach and cognitive theory overall, Segal and colleagues
(2002) do provide some explanation of the relationship between a mindful context and
mental content in individuals with depressive or anxious tendencies. They describe that
for these individuals, normal classification of incoming stimuli as pleasant or unpleasant
can trigger mind-wandering into biased elaborations such as distorted interpretations.
Using mindfulness to reduce such mind-wandering and recognize such elaborations,
fewer schematic attachments are affixed to basic observations and more attention can be
given to what is actually occurring. Segal and colleagues add that this process has the
potential not only to reduce exaggerations of negative events but also to increase
awareness of pleasant events. With this explanation, they imply that the context-oriented
approach of MBCT, and of mindfulness in general, can affect mental content so that it is
less affected by negativity biases and instead occupied with other information.
In sum, mindfulness-based approaches such as MBCT may alter cognitive content
even though they are focused on context. Further, it should be noted that the perspectivetaking process of traditional CT may alter cognitive context in order to change cognitive
content. Indeed, some have asked if mindfulness-based approaches actually differ from
traditional CT or if they simply call attention to context (Garratt et al., 2007). Although
the approaches undoubtedly are related, CT differs from mindfulness-based approaches
in that it may actively employ and reinforce cognitive elaboration by directly evaluating
cognition; therefore, it may sway toward mental preoccupation and endorsing certain
11

biases over others. On the other hand, mindfulness-based approaches offer a unique
process of reducing elaboration and attending to the present. This may enable individuals
to be less influenced by or susceptible to negativity biases. Hence, it would be useful to
know if mindfulness does reduce negativity bias and if this is a mechanism through
which mindfulness prevents or reduces emotional distress.
Mechanisms of Mindfulness
Before turning to reduced negativity bias as a potential mechanism of
mindfulness, it is important to consider existing evidence on possible mechanisms of
mindfulness. Research on such mechanisms is just beginning to develop (Arch &
Craske, 2006; Shapiro et al., 2006). That which has been done centers largely on
emotional reactivity and rumination without directly considering cognitive biases.
First, it has been proposed that mindfulness reduces emotional reactivity. That is,
mindfulness may attenuate the extremity of affective experience which, in turn, reduces
the likelihood of depression and anxiety. Arch and Craske (2006) found that participants
who underwent a 15-minute focused breathing induction (modeled on a mindfulness
exercise) reported significantly less negative emotion in response to negatively valenced
pictures compared to those who received a worry or unfocused attention induction. The
authors suggested that these results indicated faster recovery or less emotional reactivity
after exposure to negative stimuli. Similar conclusions have been drawn from studies
that tested the effect of acceptance-oriented inductions on coping with an aversive
situation, breathing carbon dioxide enriched air (Eifert & Heffner, 2003; Levitt, Brown,
Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004). These studies found that participants in the acceptance
12

induction condition reported less subjective anxiety and displayed less behavioral
avoidance compared to a controlled-breathing induction condition (Eifert & Heffner,
2003), and to suppression and control conditions (Levitt et al., 2004). Another study
(Broderick, 2005) found that brief mindfulness meditation improved recovery from an
induced sad mood. Further, a mixed-design study by Ortner, Kilner, and Zelazo (2007)
also was discussed in terms of emotional reactivity. They examined attentional control in
emotional contexts, comparing three conditions: two groups that were trained for seven
weeks in either mindfulness meditation or body awareness/relaxation, plus a waiting-list
control group. A measure of emotional interference that assessed reaction times on a
cognitive task during the presentation of positive, neutral or negative pictures was
administered before and after the seven weeks. Only the mindfulness meditation group
showed a significant reduction in the time used to disengage from unpleasant pictures to
respond on the cognitive task.
Some researchers (e.g., Brown et al., 2007) suggest that such findings may
indicate that emotional evenness rather than reactivity is inherent in mindfulness based on
its “non-evaluative aspect” (p. 220). Although meditation practices reduce autonomic
arousal (Takahashi, 2005) and mindfulness may reduce identification with particular
emotional responses (Segal et al., 2002), characterizing mindfulness as minimizing
affectively valenced reactions and as being non-evaluative is questionable. First, other
research suggests that increased present-moment attention can maintain or increase
sensitivity to the valence of an experience in the moment (e.g., Cioffi & Holloway, 1993;
LeBel & Dubé, 2001) and that mindfulness is associated with increased compassion
13

(Neff, 2003). Moreover, describing mindfulness as non-evaluative may be problematic
because mindfulness would not be adaptive if it precluded all discernment. The
nondiscriminatory property of mindfulness pertains to remaining open to and curious
about all information, including affective information and evaluative reactions, with
attentional flexibility. Likewise, Nielsen and Kaszniak (2006) found that Buddhist
meditators displayed increased awareness and clarity of emotions including improved
valence discrimination. Indeed, Ortner and colleagues‟ (2007) findings provide evidence
of attentional flexibility resulting from training in mindfulness meditation. Further, a
study by Wenk-Sormaz (2005) provided preliminary evidence that meditation training
may reduce habitual responding. Such results support the contention here that
mindfulness produces more clearly informed, less biased appraisals rather than habitually
biased reactions, which could produce greater equanimity when appropriate but differs
from the idea that mindfulness simply attenuates affective reactions.
In fact, it is possible that all of the above findings used to support the emotional
reactivity explanation could be due to the alternative explanation that participants‟ overall
evaluations were less affected by a bias toward overemphasizing negative information
(forms of this bias are also common to some degree in nonclinical populations; cf.
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Arch and Craske (2006) found that
the focused breathing condition reported less negative responses to neutral slides
compared to the unfocused attention and worry conditions. Similarly, Ortner, Kilner, and
Zelazo (2007) found that only mindfulness meditation training (and not the other
conditions) led to a decrease in negativity ratings of unpleasant stimuli. In the study by
14

Eifert and Heffner (2003), participants in the acceptance-induction condition rated the
aversive situation as less unpleasant than did the comparison group. Levitt and
colleagues (2004) reported that participants in their acceptance-induction condition did
not evaluate their physical symptoms as negatively as did those in the other two
conditions. In sum, all of these results suggest that mindfulness-based inductions
changed participants‟ evaluations – perhaps so that negative information was not
weighted as heavily – which could explain why participants appeared less emotionally
reactive.
A second proposed mechanism to the benefits of mindfulness is that mindfulness
reduces rumination, which is associated with emotional disorders. Measures of trait
mindfulness negatively correlate with rumination (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003;
Cardaciotto, 2008). Coffey and Hartman (2008) found that rumination partially mediated
a relationship between trait mindfulness and lower psychological distress. Among many
experimental studies, Ramel, Goldin, Carmona, and McQuaid (2004) found that MBSR
participation decreased rumination, and this accounted for some improvement in
additional cognitive and affective variables. Similarly, Jain and colleagues (2007) found
that mindfulness meditation training reduced rumination, which in turn partially mediated
a reduction in reported distress. Furthermore, this effect of mindfulness meditation on
rumination was not due to relaxation, given that a comparison group trained in relaxation
did not experience significantly reduced rumination.
Mindfulness is antithetical to rumination because rumination dwells in thoughts
and feelings about the past and future whereas mindfulness witnesses moment-by15

moment experience as it unfolds. The self-perpetuating nature of the dwelling that
characterizes rumination is itself problematic (Segal et al., 2002); however, a key aspect
of this dwelling is that it is negatively biased. For example, dwelling in the form of
increased rehearsal of information in an unbiased manner, such as carefully studying for
an exam or preparing a presentation, is not harmful. An important aspect of mindfulness
in terms of rumination may be that by reducing the tendency to dwell on and identify
with negative thoughts, negative schemas are engaged less and compensatory skills are
used that decrease bias. In turn, stimuli can be evaluated more objectively (when
evaluation is appropriate), perhaps reducing the amount of negatively-oriented concerns
and increasing awareness of positive qualities. Again, a shift in cognitive functioning
toward more unbiased processing may explain the association between rumination and
mindfulness.
The proposed mechanism in this thesis, that mindfulness reduces bias, has not
been examined directly but has been suggested by some research. First, a theory recently
proposed by Shapiro and colleagues (2006) to explain the mechanisms of mindfulness
suggests that a fundamental, overarching mechanism for other mechanisms is
“reperceiving.” This is described as a process of stepping back “from the contents of
consciousness (i.e., one‟s thoughts)” and viewing “his or her moment-by-moment
experience with greater clarity and objectivity” (p. 377). They continue: “Reperceiving,
in which there is increasing capacity for objectivity in relationship to one‟s
internal/external experience, is in many ways the hallmark of mindfulness practice” (p.
378). In other words, mindfulness reduces biases in attention to and processing of
16

information. Shapiro and colleagues did not provide direct evidence of such reduced
bias, but other research provides some indirect support.
The study by Ramel and colleagues (2004) aimed to examine the effects of
MBSR on cognition. They focused on rumination because it, like mindfulness, creates a
context for cognition. However, they did include a measure of dysfunctional attitudes, an
important measure of bias in emotional disorders, and reported significant improvements
on this measure resulting from the intervention. Another measure of bias was included in
a study by Heppner et al. (under review) on mindfulness and aggression. They found that
trait mindfulness was associated with less biased perceptions of hostile intent in socially
ambiguous situations.
Herndon (2008) studied trait mindfulness in relation to two cognitive factors that
could be related to bias: external encoding, a measure of thoroughness in attending to the
external environment, as well as cognitive failures, a measure of common errors from
failing to notice things. A moderate positive correlation was found between trait
mindfulness and external encoding. Additionally, strong negative correlations were
found between mindfulness and cognitive failures including memory, distractibility and
blunders. Herndon thus suggests that mindfulness could reduce errors that are due to
self-focus biases and inflexibility when interpreting one‟s environment. This explanation
does not acknowledge that self-focus may not be detrimental when it simply involves
internal state awareness rather than ruminative self-consciousness (e.g., Trapnell &
Cambell, 1999), and mindfulness seems to involve only the former (Brown & Ryan,
2003). Further, it has been suggested that this more adaptive type of self-focus in
17

mindfulness integrates better with externally focused attention (Brown et al., 2007).
Regardless, Herndon‟s results, along with those of Ramel et al. and Heppner et al.,
support that mindfulness may foster objectivity and reduce bias.
Additional indirect support comes from suggestions that mindfulness may be
characterized by less ego-involvement as indicated by less defensive behavior. Heppner
and Kernis (2007) suggest that the processes involved in being mindful "quiet the ego"
(p. 248). That is, they prevent self-worth from being linked to or threatened by everyday
affairs. They provide initial evidence for this in their research linking mindfulness to
reduced aggressiveness (Heppner et al., under review) and verbal defensiveness (Lakey,
Kernis, Heppner, & Lance, 2008). Similarly, Leary, Adams, and Tate (2006) suggest that
mindfulness promotes "hypo-egoic functioning" (p. 1822) by decreasing abstract
thoughts about the self and increasing concrete thoughts on one's current situation.
Building on this hypothesis, they suggest that mindfulness may improve self-regulation
by helping people to accept and engage reality. While more research is needed on such
ideas, they suggest that by being less self-defensive, more mindful individuals may
experience more openness to current reality. This could also imply that adjustments to
thought content occur with less effort or internal conflict. In interventions like MBCT,
this may facilitate the reduction in negativity biased cognition that is key in CT.
Research directly testing this proposed mechanism is warranted.
Mechanisms: Methodological Issues
One likely reason that the relationship between mindfulness and bias has not
received more direct empirical attention is simply the nascence of research on
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mindfulness as an isolated construct rather than as part of a larger intervention. Selfreport scales are the primary measures of mindfulness, and these were developed and
tested only recently. Moreover, some disagreement exists over how to operationalize the
construct (e.g., Bishop, 2002; Grossman, 2008). For example, the Mindful Attention
Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003) is a unidimensional measure of present-centered
attention and awareness based on reverse-scored items describing inattentiveness.
Although this scale could be critiqued as reductionistic (Grossman, 2008), in comparison
to many others this measure may better reflect the core of traditional Buddhist
conceptualizations. On the other hand, the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills
(KIMS; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) and the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire
(FFMQ; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006) are multidimensional
measures including the following factors: observing, describing, acting with awareness,
accepting without judging, and – for the FFMQ – nonreactivity to inner experience.
These scales reflect some Western practitioners‟ preference for a multidimensional
measure that mirrors the skills taught in many mindfulness-based interventions; however,
these factors may extend beyond traditional notions of mindfulness and some of the
factors overlap with each other. Perhaps finding some middle ground, Cardaciotto and
colleagues (2008) just developed the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHILMS), a
bidimensional measure of two key components that are found in most Western definitions
of mindfulness and appear to contribute to mental health: present-moment awareness and
acceptance. The different measures of trait mindfulness tend to correlate with each other,
but the magnitude varies (Cardaciotto et al., 2008; Grossman, 2008).
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Similar challenges are found in laboratory-based inductions attempting to
manipulate mindfulness. Because true mindfulness requires training over time,
approximations of mindfulness are used for efficiency and to explore the effects of
simple instructions on novices. These proxies for mindfulness, such as Arch and
Craske‟s (2006) “focused breathing” induction, LeBel and Dubé‟s (2001) “sensory
focusing” induction, and Eifert and Heffner‟s (2003) “acceptance” induction, emphasize
somewhat different aspects of mindfulness.
In sum, multiple operationalizations now exist to study the construct but some
differences have yet to be resolved. This limitation may be most problematic to those
with extensive experience in Buddhist psychology; some criticize all existing measures
because mindfulness “is not to be fully comprehended by discursive, theoretical, or
intellectual thinking but primarily relies on practical introspective practices considered
undeveloped in most inexperienced individuals” (Grossman, 2008, p. 405). Nonetheless,
most Western researchers seem to find practical value and relevance – as well as
converging evidence – in the progress that has been made and call for more research on
the mechanisms of mindfulness (e.g., Brown et al., 2007; Shapiro et al., 2006).
A Social Psychological Approach: Attitudinal and Attributional Biases
Another potential reason that biases have not been studied in relation to
mindfulness is that certain types of biases tend to be studied in domains outside of
applied clinical psychology, which has been the primary area of mindfulness research.
Biases have been referred to broadly here thus far, but they may occur in various
cognitive processes. Two well-established domains of social psychological research, in
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which cognitive biases have been examined and linked to depression and anxiety, will be
the focus of the present research: attitudes, which will be the primary consideration, and
attributions.
Attitudes are summary evaluations made toward some object (Zanna & Rempel,
1988), which can be any object including the self. These summary evaluations are items
of knowledge associated with an object (cf. Fazio, 2007) that vary on a positive to
negative continuum, such as good/bad, desirable/undesirable, approach/avoid, and so
forth (Breckler, 1984). According to the tripartite model as described by Zanna and
Rempel, attitudes may be based on affective, cognitive and/or behavioral information.
Because attitudes by their very nature involve a range from positive to negative,
examining attitudes is very useful for uncovering biases toward negativity (or positivity,
for that matter).
It is unsurprising, then, that negatively-oriented attitudes are characteristic of the
cognitive biases found in depression and anxiety (Garratt et al., 2007; Kopp, 1989). In
the clinical literature, attitudinal bias often is measured with self-report instruments like
the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978), which assesses the
extent to which one‟s self-evaluations are based on inflexible and unrealistic standards.
Such measures can be useful. At the same time, they are subject to self-presentational
concerns and are based on specific scenarios. That is, individuals may not provide honest
responses on self-report measures because of motivations to present themselves in a
certain light or to meet the expectations of the person distributing the measure (Miller,
Doob, Butler, & Marlowe, 1965); further, the specific scenarios use particular domain21

relevant biases as indicators of negativity bias rather than assessing if an overall
negativity bias is involved in the process of forming attitudes. However, at least one
social psychological approach is now available that provides a cleaner test of overall
negativity bias in attitude formation.
Fazio, Eiser, and Shook (2004) developed a new technique, a computer “game”
called BeanFest, to assess attitude formation through associative learning: learning to
associate a positive or negative valence with an object. Participants are instructed that
they will find themselves in an imaginary world of beans, and their goal is to learn which
beans are good and which beans are bad in order to succeed at the game. One of the
unique advantages of this paradigm is that the beans are completely novel targets for
evaluation. Participants have no prior knowledge of the beans, so learning and attitude
formation can be assessed without motivational concerns or prior experience affecting the
measurement. The beans vary in appearance (i.e., shape and number of speckles) and
valence. In order to prevent participants from easily learning about the bean world, the
beans were created carefully so that there is not a simple, linear rule (e.g., all circular
beans are positive) by which participants can associate the appearance of the bean with its
valence. To maintain and gain points in the game, participants must learn which
individual beans are positive and which are negative. Beans are presented one at a time,
and participants choose whether to select (approach) or not select (avoid) each bean.
After participants make their decision, they are provided with feedback informing them
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of the specific bean‟s valence.1 If they chose to select the bean, they earn 10 points if it
was positively valenced, but they lose 10 points if it was negatively valenced. If they
chose not to select the bean, their score remains unchanged. Half of the beans are
positive and half are negative. Thus, all participants, regardless of their game scores,
experience an equal amount of information about – and equal opportunities to learn –
positive and negative stimuli. Specifically, each game bean is presented three times, so
participants have three opportunities to learn each bean during the game.
Learning of the valence of each bean is assessed in a test phase after the game
phase. During the test phase, individual beans are presented and participants simply
categorize them according to valence. No points are involved and no feedback is
provided. If participants correctly identify the valence of more negative beans from the
game than positive beans, this demonstrates negatively biased learning of attitudes:
learning negative evaluations better than positive evaluations. Importantly, this specific
negativity bias has been associated with negative cognitive styles and predisposition to
depression and anxiety (Shook, Fazio, & Vasey, 2007).
In addition to beans presented during the game, the test phase also includes beans
that are systematically similar to the game beans but were not presented in the game; this
assesses generalization of learned attitudes to similar but novel stimuli. In their original
studies, Fazio, Eiser, and Shook (2004) found a robust tendency for individuals to
generalize negative attitudes to a greater extent than positive attitudes. Moreover, this

1

This describes the version of the game that will be used in this study because of its established relevancy
to the cognitive biases found in those who are predisposed to depression and anxiety (Shook, Fazio, &
Vasey, 2007). However, another version of the game does exist in which feedback is contingent upon bean
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generalization asymmetry was apparent when learning was controlled, so the
generalization bias was not simply a by-product of negatively biased learning.
Negatively biased generalization of attitudes, after accounting for the learning bias, has
also been observed in individuals predisposed to depression and anxiety (Shook & Fazio,
unpublished data). Individuals who were more predisposed to depression and anxiety
tended to exhibit greater generalization of negative attitudes. In sum, research using
BeanFest has found that individuals who are predisposed to depression and anxiety learn
negative attitudes better than positive ones (Shook et al., 2007), and they also are more
likely to evaluate a similar but unknown target negatively. In particular, they fail to learn
to appreciate positive stimuli. These results provide clean, objective evidence of a
negativity bias occurring during the process of attitude formation.
BeanFest may be an especially useful tool for examining the implications of
mindfulness on cognitive content as it relates to depression and anxiety. It has been
proposed here that mindfulness may alter cognitive content so that it is less biased, by
disengaging from (deactivating) negative schemas and re-directing cognition to a wider,
more curious observation of current experience. All aspects of experience, positive and
negative (or neutral), should be acknowledged as they are. Such improved objectivity
could be revealed through more accurate learning and generalization of the valence of
both positive and negative stimuli within the BeanFest paradigm. If that were the case,
this may suggest that mindfulness enables evaluative abilities to be deployed more
adaptively, rather than in the biased fashion that characterizes depression and anxiety.

selection. Such a format provides interesting information about exploratory behavior but does not isolate
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Besides negativity biases related to attitudes, negatively biased attributions, or
inferences about the causes and implications of events, have also been highlighted as a
significant part of the negative cognitive style in depression and anxiety (Garratt et al.,
2007; Fresco, Alloy, & Reilly-Harrington, 2006). Specifically, individuals with
depression or anxiety tend to attribute negative life events to internal, stable and global
causes (Fresco et al., 2006). Such attributions typically are measured using self-report
instruments that ask participants to imagine themselves in specific scenarios and then to
indicate the causes and implications. Although these measures have the same drawbacks
mentioned for the self-report attitudinal measures, they would provide additional
evidence of less biased cognition in relation to mindfulness. The association between
mindfulness and thoroughness in attending to external information (Herndon, 2008)
suggests that mindfulness would reduce biases toward internal attributions for negative
life events. Combined with the present-moment orientation of mindfulness, this
increased external encoding should also enable attributions toward temporary and
context-specific causes rather than stable and global ones. Thus, there is evidence to
suggest mindfulness may reduce the attributional biases that characterize depression and
anxiety. Demonstrating this would further suggest that mindfulness reduces bias.
The current research aimed to determine whether reduced negativity bias is a
feasible mechanism by which mindfulness practices reduce emotional disorders. Two
studies were designed to test the link between mindfulness and negativity bias.
Specifically, the current research examined how mindfulness affected attitude formation

the cognitive bias that is relevant to the current study.
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in BeanFest as well as self-report measures of attitudes and attributions. These measures
were selected to indicate if mindfulness fosters less biased and more adaptive evaluative
and inferential processes, providing a direct empirical test of the notion that mindfulness
entails less bias. This may explain why mindfulness helps to alleviate depression and
anxiety: It may facilitate a correction of negatively biased cognitive content without
requiring cognitive elaboration or direct restructuring. As such, the current work may
have significant implications for clinical practices and it may also point to additional
benefits of mindfulness for relating to the self and the social world.
Present Studies
Two studies were conducted to test if mindfulness reduces negatively biased
cognition. The first study aimed to establish correlational relations between trait
mindfulness and the aforementioned measures of bias in attitudes and attributions, with a
focus on attitude formation. First, it was predicted that as trait mindfulness increases,
accuracy in attitude formation (both learning and generalization in BeanFest) would also
increase. That is, more mindful individuals would learn negative and positive beans
more equally (i.e., exhibit less of a negative learning bias) and would exhibit more
equivalence in generalizing positive and negative attitudes (i.e., exhibit less of a negative
generalization bias). As mindfulness was proposed to reduce bias overall, it was not
expected that mindful individuals would show a reversal of the learning and
generalization biases (i.e., better learning of positive beans and more generalization of
positive attitudes). It was further hypothesized that this increased accuracy in attitude
formation would mediate inverse relationships between trait mindfulness and both
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depression and anxiety. Finally, to provide further support for the proposed relationship
between mindfulness and reduced biases, mindfulness was also expected to inversely
correlate with measures of dysfunctional attitudes and attributions that characterize a
negative cognitive style, which would also mediate the anticipated mindfulnessemotional disorder relationship.
After establishing correlational relationships, an experimental framework
was used in the second study to test the causal link between mindfulness and reduced
negativity bias. A mindfulness-based laboratory induction was compared with a control
induction for effects on attitude formation and cognitive style. It was expected that the
mindfulness condition would show more accurate learning and generalization of object
valence than the control condition. Specifically, it was predicted that compared to the
control condition, individuals in the mindfulness-induction condition would learn
negative and positive beans more equally (i.e., exhibit less of a negative learning bias,
without reversing to a positivity bias) and would exhibit more equivalence in generalizing
positive and negative attitudes (i.e., exhibit less of a negative generalization bias, without
reversing to a positivity bias). Effects on the additional measures of negative cognitive
style, including attitudes and attributions, also were explored. Again, participants in the
mindfulness condition were expected to demonstrate less negatively biased processing.
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CHAPTER 2 Study One
The purpose of the first study was to demonstrate the associations between
mindfulness, negativity bias, and emotional disorders. As this was a first step in
specifically testing reduced negativity bias as an underlying mechanism to the benefits of
mindfulness, Study One was correlational in nature. Negativity bias was measured using
several cognitive style questionnaires which assessed attitudes and attributions. In
addition, the BeanFest paradigm was used as a more covert measure of biased processing
in attitude formation and attitude generalization. Emotional disorders were assessed with
several commonly used depression and anxiety scales. Finally, two measures of trait
mindfulness were used.
It was hypothesized that mindfulness would be inversely correlated with
negativity bias, positively correlated with accuracy (in BeanFest), and negatively
correlated with depression and anxiety. Specifically:
1. Trait mindfulness was expected to positively correlate with equivalent learning
and equivalent generalization of positive and negative valences in BeanFest, as this
would indicate more accurate attitude formation and generalization. Stated in terms of
bias, mindfulness was expected to predict less asymmetrical attitude formation and less
negatively biased generalization of attitudes.
2. Trait mindfulness was predicted to inversely correlate with negativity biases in
self-report measures of both attitudes and attributions.

28

3. Trait mindfulness was anticipated to inversely correlate with self-report
measures of depression and anxiety.
4. The expected inverse relationship between mindfulness and emotional
disorders was predicted to be mediated by less negativity bias.
Method
Participants
A convenience sample of 191 undergraduate psychology students was recruited
using the university‟s online study recruitment system, Sona. A power analysis (Cohen,
1992) based on .80 power, an alpha level of .05, and a medium effect size had determined
a necessary sample size of 177. Students participated for extra course credit. The study
topic was advertised as “Personality and Games” to conceal the hypotheses and to incite
interest. Those under 18 years of age and those who had participated in other studies
using BeanFest were not eligible to participate.
Eight participants‟ data were excluded: three because of technical issues (e.g.,
computer freezing), two who did not speak English sufficiently, and three who did not
follow directions and take the study seriously (e.g., using the same response key for every
questionnaire item). Thus, the final sample size was 183. Over half of the participants
were male (59%), and the mean age was 19.4 years (SD = 3.4). The sample was fairly
diverse, with 55% identifying as „White,‟ 23% „African American/Black,‟ 11% „Asian,‟
7% „Hispanic/Latino,‟ and 7% „Other.‟
Measures
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BeanFest. Attitude formation and attitude generalization were assessed with
BeanFest (Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004). From a participant‟s standpoint, BeanFest
appears to be a computer game set in an imaginary world of beans that vary in
appearance. Participants choose to select or not to select individual beans. After
choosing, they see the bean‟s point value: either +10 points (positively valenced) or -10
points (negatively valenced). If they selected the bean, then their score – which starts at
50 points and may range from 0 to 100 points – adjusts accordingly. If they did not select
the bean, then their score remains unchanged.
The beans differ in shape (circular to oval to oblong) and in number of speckles
(1-10), as presented by the matrix of 100 possible shape-speckle combinations in Figure
1. From this matrix, six regions of beans (36 beans total) were carefully selected for
inclusion in the game. The regions were created so that no linear relationship exists
between the shape or speckles of the bean and its valence. This ensures that participants
must learn the valence of each bean individually rather than learning a simple rule that
would explain the valence of multiple beans.
After a practice round in which participants view one bean from each of the six
regions, participants proceed through three blocks of the game. In each block, the 36
game beans are presented individually, in random order. Whether or not the participant
selects the bean, feedback about the valence of the bean is provided to ensure equal
learning opportunities for all 36 beans. By providing feedback about all beans,
information gain is not dependent on game behavior and a bias in learning can be
assessed more purely. After the game phase is complete, a test phase assesses learning
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and generalization of the valence of the beans. In this test phase, each of the 100 beans
from the matrix is presented in random order. The participant is simply asked to
categorize the bean as “good” (increases points when selected) or “bad” (decreases points
when selected). No feedback is provided during this phase. Responses to the 36 game
beans indicate learning. Responses to the remaining 64 beans indicate generalization to
similar but novel stimuli.
To assess learning biases, the proportion of positive game beans learned correctly
was subtracted from the proportion of negative game beans learned correctly. A positive
difference indicates negatively biased learning. No bias – equal learning of positives and
negatives – results in a zero difference. In addition, each proportion (positive and
negative beans learned correctly) can be examined to reveal if a learning bias is due to
exceptional learning of one valence or to poor learning of the other valence.
To assess the overall generalization bias, positive responses to the novel beans
were coded as -1, whereas negative responses were coded as +1. Responses to the 64
novel beans were averaged to represent overall generalization. With this coding scheme,
positive numbers represent greater generalization of negative attitudes, or more negativity
bias, and negative numbers represent greater generalization of positive attitudes.
Unbiased generalization is represented by a mean around zero, equivalence between the
number of novel beans classified as positive and negative.
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Number of speckles: 1-10
Circular
1: Positive bean
(+10 points)
-1: Negative bean
(-10 points)

Oval

Oblong

Figure 1. Matrix of shape-speckle combinations and six regions of game beans in
BeanFest

Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988). Mood state was assessed to ensure that relationships between the variables of
interest were not due to participants‟ current mood. This commonly used self-report
measure is comprised of two subscales that assess two global dimensions of affect,
positive and negative. Participants rate each of 20 adjectives (e.g., enthusiastic,
distressed) using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (very
much), to indicate the extent to which they are currently experiencing the descriptor.
Scores for each subscale are totaled, with higher scores indicating higher positive or
negative affect. The PANAS has shown good convergent and discriminant validity, testretest reliability, and internal consistency (for Study 1, α = .89 for positive affect and α =
.83 for negative affect; for Study 2, α = .87 for positive affect and α = .86 for negative
affect).
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Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978). The DAS was
used as a measure of negative cognitive style. It is a 64-item self-report measure of
cognitive distortions based on Beck‟s cognitive theory (1987) of depression. The items
represent implicit rules and conditions that involve inflexible or unrealistic standards for
oneself. Each statement is rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (totally agree) to 7
(totally disagree). Higher scores indicate a greater degree of dysfunctional cognitions.
Example items include “I should be happy all the time,” and “I am nothing if a person I
love does not love me.” The DAS has shown good convergent validity, test-retest
reliability, and internal consistency (for Study 1, α = .87; for Study 2, α = .91).
Looming Maladaptive Style Questionnaire (LMSQ; Riskind, Williams, Theodore,
Chrosniak, & Cortina, 2000). This is a measure based on the Looming Vulnerability
Model (LVM; Riskind, 1997; Riskind, Williams, & Joiner, 2006) of anxiety. It assesses
the tendency to create mental representations of potentially threatening situations that are
rapidly rising in risk or intensifying in danger. Participants read six short vignettes
describing potentially stressful situations and then complete three questions for each
vignette on 5-point scales. The three questions ask whether the chances of having a
difficulty seem to be decreasing or expanding with each moment, if the level of threat
seems fairly constant or is growing rapidly larger with each moment, and how much they
visualize their problem as not changing or in the act of becoming progressively worse.
Responses to the three questions for the six vignettes are combined to produce a total
score. The LMSQ shows adequate validity, test-retest reliability, and internal consistency
(for Study 1, α = .70; for Study 2, α = .73).
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Future Events Scale (FES; Anderson, 1990). A final measure of biased cognitive
processing is comprised of two subscales measuring optimism and pessimism based on
the perceived likelihood of specific positive and negative future events. It is composed of
26 items describing 13 positive events and 13 negative events. Using an 11-point scale
ranging from -5 (extremely unlikely) to +5 (extremely likely), participants rate the
likelihood of each event happening to them at some point in their lives. Ratings were
totaled for each subscale. Higher scores indicate more optimistic or pessimistic outcome
expectancies, depending on the subscale. This scale shows good convergent and
discriminant validity, test-retest reliability, and internal consistency (for Study 1, α =. 88
for optimism and α = .81 for pessimism; for Study 2, α = .90 for optimism and α =.77 for
pessimism).
Beck Depression Inventory –II (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI is a
routinely used self-report measure designed to assess the intensity of affective, cognitive,
motivational, and physiological symptoms of depression.2 It consists of 21 items, each of
which contains 4 self-evaluative statements that range in intensity on a 4-point scale from
0 to 3. For example, an item called “Past Failure” ranges from “I do not feel like a
failure” (0) to “I feel I am a total failure as a person” (3). Total scores can range from 0
to 63. The BDI-II has good psychometric properties (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996)
including internal consistency (for Study 1, α = .89).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983). The STAI is a widely
used self-report instrument that contains two subscales to measure state and trait anxiety.
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Each subscale consists of 20 items, which are rated on a 4-point scale of intensity for the
state subscale and a 4-point scale of frequency for the trait subscale. Participants
complete the state subscale followed by the trait subscale. A sample item from the state
subscale is “I am jittery,” and a sample item from the trait subscale is “I worry too much
over something that really doesn‟t matter.” Each subscale shows good internal
consistency (for Study 1, α = .91 for the trait subscale and α = .92 for the state subscale;
for Study 2, α = .92 for the state subscale)
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). The BAI is
a unidimensional self-report measure of trait anxiety. It was developed specifically to
measure severity of anxiety and to discriminate anxiety from depression. The inventory
consists of 21 items stating common symptoms of anxiety (e.g., terrified, hands
trembling), which are rated on 4-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (severely).
Total scores can range from 0 to 63. The BAI shows adequate validity and internal
consistency (for Study 1, α = .90).
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003). The MAAS
is a unidimensional self-report measure of present-moment oriented attention and
awareness. It contains 15 items scored on a 6-point scale from 1 (almost always) to 6
(almost never). Example items include: “I find it difficult to stay focused on what‟s
happening in the present” and “I find myself doing things without really paying
attention.” Item scores are totaled; higher mean scores reflect higher mindfulness. This
widely used scale shows adequate psychometric properties such as convergent and

2

The BDI includes items that indicate suicidal intentions. Participants who reported such intentions were
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discriminant validity as well as test-retest reliability and internal consistency (for Study 1,
α = .91; for Study 2, α =.84).
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHILMS; Cardaciotto et al., 2008). The
PHILMS is a bidimensional self-report measure of present-moment awareness and
acceptance, or receptivity, toward experiences. It contains 20 items, 10 per component,
rated on a 5-point scale from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). An example item from the
awareness subscale is “When I walk outside, I am aware of smells or how the air feels
against my face.” An example item from the acceptance subscale is “I tell myself that I
shouldn‟t have certain thoughts.” Scores are totaled, yielding a total mindfulness score
and scores for each subscale. Higher mindfulness is indicated by higher total scores, and
higher awareness and acceptance are indicated by higher scores on each respective
subscale. This recently developed measure shows a strong two-factor solution, adequate
convergent and discriminant validity, and respectable internal consistency for both
subscales (for Study 1, α = .81 for awareness and α =.86 for acceptance).
Demographics. Demographic information describing the sample was collected,
including gender, age, marital status, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. Additionally,
participants were asked to report the amount of time they had spent practicing
mindfulness meditation, transcendental meditation, yoga, tai chi, and similar practices.
Procedure
Participants were greeted by an experimenter and told that they would be
participating in a study on personality and games. Up to six participants completed a

identified and promptly referred to counseling. This limit to confidentiality was stated in the consent form.
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session at one time, but they were seated at individual computer cubicles and did not
interact. Informed consent was obtained by the experimenter before proceeding with the
study procedures. Then, participants completed the BeanFest game and the
questionnaires. All instructions, measures, and debriefing statements were administered
on Dell Optiplex 745 computers, using the programs Inquisit and MediaLab. At the end
of the session, participants were informed of the study‟s true purpose. Any questions
were answered and the participants were thanked and dismissed.
Results
Preliminary analyses
Initial inspections of the data revealed six outliers: one for the Negative Affect
subscale of the PANAS, one for the BDI, one for the BAI, one for the Pessimism
subscale of the FES, and two for the Optimism subscale of the FES. Comparisons of the
5% trimmed mean to the overall mean for each of variables determined that these values
significantly affected the mean, so they were excluded. After excluding these values, the
distributions for all variables were normal.
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations and ranges, for all
variables of interest can be found in Table 1. Measures of central tendency and
variability for the affective, cognitive style, and mindfulness measures were consistent
with previous findings.
For the BeanFest data, a phi coefficient between bean valence and test-phase
categorization was calculated for each participant to indicate how well he or she learned
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the valence of the game beans. The mean phi coefficient was .19 (SD =.26), which was
significantly different from zero, t(182) = 9.98, p < .001, indicating that overall the
participants did learn. The percent of positive beans correct (M =.59, SD =.15) and
percent of negative beans correct (M =.60, SD =.18) both were significantly greater than
chance (50 percent), t(181) = 7.88, p < .001 for percent positive correct and t(181) = 7.44,
p < .001 for percent negative correct. The difference between these two indices – that is,
the learning asymmetry – was .01, which a t-test showed to be equivalent to a zero
difference, t(181) = .73, p = .47. Previous research (e.g., Fazio et al., 2004, study 2)
based on the version of BeanFest used here (which provided feedback on bean valence
after each trial) also has found nonsignificant learning asymmetries. Such experiments
still found significant generalization asymmetries; similarly, the mean generalization
asymmetry here of .03 (SD = .23) showed a marginally significant difference from zero,
t(182) = 1.96, p = .051.
It should be noted that learning, as indicated by the mean phi coefficient and
percents positive and negative correct, was lower in the current sample than in previous
experiments. For comparison, previous research (Shook et al., 2007) using this version
of BeanFest found a mean phi coefficient of .41 and percents positive and negative
correct of .67 and .73, respectively. Further examination of the present data revealed that
30 percent of the sample had phi coefficients of zero or less, indicating no or incorrect
learning. Potential reasons for this relatively low learning will be explored in the
discussion.
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Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and ranges for all variables of interest (Study 1)
Variable
BeanFest indices
Learninga
Percent positive correct
Percent negative correct
Learning asymmetryb
Generalization asymmetryc
Cognitive style measures
DAS
LMSQ
FES – Optimism subscale
FES – Pessimism subscale
Affect measures
PANAS – positive affect subscale
PANAS – negative affect subscale
BDI
BAI
STAI – trait subscale
STAI – state subscale
Mindfulness measures
MAAS
PHILMS (Total)
Awareness subscale
Acceptance subscale

Mean

SD

Range

.19
.59
.60
.01
.03

.26
.15
.18
.22
.23

1.24
.83
.89
1.44
1.30

121.90
56.30
26.15
-6.69

26.96
9.10
16.07
18.48

129.00
62.00
83.00
92.00

25.17
16.42
12.46
13.38
42.06
40.11

8.27
5.61
9.11
9.70
11.39
11.68

37.00
25.00
42.00
44.00
51
54

3.89
65.31
36.46
28.85

.98
9.41
6.44
7.64

5.00
57.00
28.00
40.00

DAS = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; LMSQ = Looming Maladaptive Style Questionnaire; FES = Future Events
Scale; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; BDI – Beck Depression Inventory II; STAI = State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; PHILMS =
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale
a

Phi coefficient between actual valence of bean and participant‟s classification of the bean during the test phase.

b

Learning asymmetry: Proportion negative correct minus proportion positive correct; reflects bias in attitude formation

c

Generalization asymmetry: Number classified negative minus number classified positive; reflects bias/accuracy in
generalization
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Correlations: BeanFest indices and affective and cognitive style measures
Zero-order correlations between the BeanFest indices and the affective and
cognitive style measures are shown in Table 2. The BeanFest indices all correlated
significantly with one another, as anticipated. Those who reported more negative affect
on the PANAS and state anxiety on the STAI exhibited poorer learning in BeanFest.
Unexpectedly, percent negative correct was inversely associated with negative affect as
well as with dysfunctional attitudes. Moreover, contrary to past findings, no other
significant correlations were found between the BeanFest indices and the affective or
cognitive style measures.3
Correlations: BeanFest indices and mindfulness measures
Nonetheless, two interesting correlations emerged in the correlational analysis of
the BeanFest indices and the mindfulness measures (see Table 2). Overall learning was
positively associated with mindfulness as measured by the MAAS.4 That is, more
mindful individuals learned bean valences better. MAAS scores also correlated
significantly with percent positive correct, suggesting that better learning may have been
due to greater learning of positives. Similarly, the correlation between the PHILMS and
percent positive correct was marginally significant. These associations provide initial
support for the idea that mindfulness enables greater attention to positively valenced
stimuli.

3

Partial correlations controlling for learning also did not replicate past relationships between these
measures.
4
Controlling for negative affect, the MAAS trended toward significant correlations with learning and
percent positive correct.
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Table 2
Zero-order correlations between BeanFest indices and cognitive style, affective, and
mindfulness measures (Study 1)

Affect
Positive affect
Negative affect
BDI
BAI
STAI Trait
STAI State
Cognitive style
DAS
LMSQ
FES Optimism
FES Pessimism
Mindfulness
MAAS
PHILMS Total
Awareness subscale
Acceptance subscale
BeanFest indices
Learning
Percent positive correct
Percent negative correct
Learning asymmetry
Generalization asymmetry
†

Learning

Percent
positive
correct

Percent
negative
correct

Learning
asymmetry

Generalization
asymmetry

.04
-.21**
-.12†
-.10
-.14
-.23**

.10
-.08
-.11
-.07
-.14
-.16†

-.03
-.22**
-.08
-.07
-.06
-.16†

-.10
-.13†
.01
-.01
.05
-.03

-.10
-.06
.02
.00
.12
.06

-.14†
-.06
-.11
-.03

-.02
-.08
-.10
-.03

-.16*
-.02
-.07
-.01

-.11
.04
.01
.03

-.10
-.01
-.01
.03

.15*
.09
.00
.11

.16*
.13†
.03
.13

.08
.02
-.01
.03

-.04
-.07
-.03
-.06

.07
-.03
-.02
-.02

.70**
.82**
.20**
.30**

-.16*
-.57**
-.16*

--.73**
.52**

---.55**

-----

p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Correlations: Affective and cognitive style measures
Table 3 contains the zero-order correlations between the cognitive style and
affective measures. As expected, the measures of negative cognitive style (the DAS,
LMSQ and FES Pessimism subscale) all correlated positively. These measures also
inversely correlated with optimism as measured by the FES.
As in past studies, the BDI, BAI, and STAI were highly correlated with each
other. Also as anticipated, these measures positively correlated with the measures of
negative cognitive style and inversely correlated with the FES Optimism subscale.
All of these relationships remained significant when controlling for state affect.
Correlations: Mindfulness, affective, and cognitive style measures
Table 3 also lists the zero-order correlations between the mindfulness measures
and the cognitive style and affective measures. In line with previous studies, the
depression and anxiety measures were inversely associated with both measures of
mindfulness (except that the BDI and STAI showed no relationship with the Awareness
subscale of the PHILMS).
Supporting the hypotheses, measures of negative cognitive style inversely
correlated with measures of mindfulness. Mindfulness measures also showed positive
correlations with the FES Optimism subscale.
Controlling for state affect did not alter the above relationships.
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Table 3
Zero-order correlations between affective, cognitive style, and mindfulness measures (Study 1)
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Affective measures
1. Positive affect
2. Negative affect
3. BDI
4. BAI
5. STAI Trait
6. STAI State
Cognitive style measures
7. DAS
8. LMSQ
9. FES Optimism
10. FES Pessimism
Mindfulness measures
11. MAAS
12. PHILMS Total
13. PHILMS Awareness
14. PHILMS Acceptance
†

2

3

4

5

6

.07
-----

-.14†
.39**
----

-.12†
.35**
.92**
---

-.32**
.43**
.73**
.66**
--

-.25**
.54**
.63**
.66**
.78**

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----------

p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
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7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

-.16*
.16*
.27**
.20**
.39**
.28**

.26**
-.20**
-.33**
-.33**
-.46**
-.43**

-.23**
.21**
.31**
.28**
.43**
.42**

.08
-.23**
-.47**
-.48**
-.47**
-.52**

.28**
-.22**
-.46**
-.42**
-.60**
-.48**

.13†
-.02
-.13†
-.15*
-.15†
-.16†

.23**
-.25**
-.45**
-.40**
-.57**
-.44

-----

.20**
----

-.33**
-.20**
---

.29**
.30**
-.49**
--

-.29**
-.18*
.25**
-.33**

-.36**
-.26**
.34**
-.33**

-.13†
.02
.32**
-.04

-.33**
-.34**
.16*
-.38*

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

.56**
----

.23**
.59**
---

.49**
.73**
.59**
--

-.18*
.42**
.30**
.22**
.41**
.38**

Mediational analysis
The mediational analysis tested whether the inverse relationship between the
mindfulness and depression/anxiety measures could be accounted for by the negative
cognitive style measures, while controlling for state affect. (Because the BeanFest
indices did not significantly correlate with the depression and anxiety measures, these
were not included in the mediational analysis.)
For ease of presentation and considering the strong correlations among the three
categories of questionnaires, composite variables for mindfulness, negative cognitive
style, and depression/anxiety were computed as the mean of standardized scores on the
relevant measures.5 To meet the conditions for mediation, three relationships were
necessary and found among the composite variables: (1) mindfulness correlated
(inversely) with depression/anxiety, r(177) = -.46, p < .001, (2) mindfulness correlated
(inversely) with negative cognitive style, r(177) = -.39, p < .001, and (3) negative
cognitive style correlated with depression/anxiety, r(177) = -.30, p < .001. All of these
relationships accounted for state affect. Given that the conditions for mediation were
met, the next step was to test the relationship between mindfulness and
depression/anxiety controlling for negative cognitive style (as well as state affect) to
examine if doing so reduced the magnitude of the relationship. Accounting for negative
cognitive style did decrease the magnitude of the correlation between mindfulness and
depression/anxiety scores, r(177) = -.39, p < .001. Although the partial correlation
remained significant, a Sobel‟s test (Baron & Kenny, 1986) revealed that the decrease

5

The same results also were found using the individual measures.
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was significant, z = -3.36, p < .001. Thus, the inverse relationship between mindfulness
and depression/anxiety measures was partially mediated by negative cognitive style. The
mediation model and results are depicted in Figure 2.

r = -.39

Negative cognitive
style

r = .30

Depression/anxiety

Mindfulness
r = -.46 (pr = -.39)

Sobel‟s z = -3.36, p < .001

Figure 2. Mediation model and analysis (Study 1)

Discussion
The first study aimed to link greater mindfulness to less negativity bias on
measures of attitude formation and negative cognitive style, and to examine if less
negativity bias explains the inverse relationship between mindfulness and emotional
distress. Trait mindfulness was associated with overall learning in the BeanFest game
and specifically with learning positively valenced information, or forming positive
attitudes. This provides initial support for the hypothesis that mindfulness is associated
with less negativity bias. More support was found from the correlations between trait
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mindfulness and negative cognitive style. Not only did mindfulness inversely correlate
with all measures of negative cognitive style, this relationship partially accounted for the
inverse association between mindfulness and emotional distress. That is, part of the
reason that those who were higher in mindfulness reported less depression and anxiety
appears to be that they experienced less negativity bias in cognition. Of course, other
factors also must be considered to fully explain the relationship between mindfulness and
emotional disturbance. Nonetheless, these initial findings suggest that cognitive content
does differ for more and less mindful individuals.
Interestingly, trait mindfulness not only was associated with forming positively
valenced attitudes but also was positively associated with optimism and negatively
associated with pessimism. Together, these findings could indicate a positivity bias,
which would run counter to the prediction that mindfulness is less biased overall (neither
negatively nor positively biased). Inverse correlations with BeanFest learning and
generalization asymmetries would have provided the clearest indication of positivity bias,
but these were not found.6 Unfortunately, because learning in BeanFest was relatively
low and past findings were not replicated, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from
these data. One potential reason for the low learning may be that the data were collected
at the end of the semester when student-participants may be less intrinsically motivated
and more fatigued as they rush to complete multiple experimental sessions by the end of
the semester.

6

Additionally, no correlations were found with absolute values of the learning and generalization
asymmetries. The absolute values indicate the degree of any bias, positive or negative.
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Nonetheless, Study One did provide correlational evidence that trait mindfulness
is associated with less negativity bias, and it raised questions about a possible positivity
bias. Study Two extended this research by testing experimentally if mindfulness causes a
reduction in negativity bias. The second study also allowed for the BeanFest paradigm to
be administered again, throughout the semester, to assess if mindfulness reduces
negativity bias in attitude formation and whether or not it leads to positivity bias.
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CHAPTER 3 Study Two

The second study used a between-groups experiment to test for a causal
relationship between mindfulness and negativity bias. The goal of the study was to
determine whether a mindful state would reduce negativity biases in attitude formation
and generalization. Specifically, a laboratory induction of mindfulness was compared to
an unfocused attention induction to test for reduced bias in attitude formation and
generalization within the BeanFest paradigm. Originally, it was predicted that the
mindfulness induction condition would demonstrate less biased learning and, thus,
exhibit more equivalence in formation and generalization of positive and negative
attitudes as compared to a control condition. However, there was also the potential that
participants in the mindfulness condition would demonstrate a positivity bias. In Study
One, more mindful participants tended to learn positive stimuli in the BeanFest game
better than less mindful participants, and they reported higher levels of optimism on the
Future Events Scale. Thus, it was possible that individuals in the mindfulness induction
condition would learn positive beans better than negative beans. Cognitive style
questionnaires from Study One also were included and the effects of the mindfulness
manipulation on these measures was explored.
Method
Participants
As in Study One, undergraduate psychology students participated for extra course
credit, and were recruited using the university‟s online study recruitment system. The
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study topic again was advertised as “Personality and Games.” Those under 18 years of
age and those who had participated in other studies using BeanFest were not eligible to
participate.
The target sample size was 150. A power analysis (Cohen, 1992) based on .80
power, an alpha level of .05, and a medium effect size determined a necessary sample
size of 128. The target was higher to account for potential exclusions. Due to atypically
slow recruitment, the total sample size was 122. Nine exclusions were made: Three were
due to technical issues (using the wrong keyboard keys; computer restart), one was
confrontational and asked to leave, and the other four did not follow directions and take
the study seriously (e.g., using the same response key for every questionnaire item).
Thus, the final sample was comprised of 113 participants (51.3% female) with an average
age of 19.91 (SD = 2.66). Thirty-nine % identified as „White,‟ 30% identified as
„Black/African-American,‟ 18% identified as „Asian,‟ 4% identified as „Hispanic/Latino,‟
and the remaining 9% identified as „Other.‟
Manipulation
The experimental condition received instructions adapted from those used
previously (Arch & Craske, 2006; Segal et al., 2002) to induce an approximation of a
mindful state. These instructions tell participants that they are going to practice a process
to help them perceive things in a way that is deeply aware of the present instant. Initial
instructions encourage participants to assume a comfortable, erect position in their chairs
and to gently guide their awareness to the current sensations in their bodies as they sit.
The instructions then guide participants to anchor their attention on the qualities of each
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breath as it occurs, without trying to control the breath but simply experiencing it as it is
in that moment with a sense of curiosity and patience if possible. Additional instructions
guide participants to register and accept any thoughts or feelings as they occur –
acknowledging them without dwelling on them. If they notice that their mind has
wandered, which tends to happen, they are to acknowledge that with a sense of selfcongratulation for reconnecting to the present moment. Reminders and variations of
these instructions are repeated periodically throughout the 15-minute instructional period.
The control condition received instructions on unfocused attention adapted from
Arch and Craske (2006). These instructions tell participants that they are going to
practice a process to perceive things in a way that lets their mind wander freely. They are
told to simply think about whatever comes to mind, and to let their mind wander freely
without trying to focus on anything in particular. Close variants of these instructions are
repeated throughout the 15-minute instructional period at the same time intervals used in
the mindfulness induction instructions.
Both sets of instructions were pilot tested prior to the start of Study Two, with a
state version of the MAAS administered afterward as a manipulation check. The state
MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003) includes 5 items from the larger trait MAAS measure,
slightly rephrased to assess state mindfulness. The items were selected for the state scale
based on their applicability to a variety of situations. The state MAAS has shown good
predictive and construct validity. It also has demonstrated internal reliability (α = .92)
when repeated measures were collapsed across time in previous research (Brown &
Ryan, 2003), based on its small number of items. This manipulation check was performed
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only during pilot testing to avoid exposing the control participants to potential cues to be
mindful during the actual experiment. A t-test was used to compare the two conditions
on the state MAAS and confirmed that the mindfulness induction condition scored higher
(M = 3.50, SD = .88) than the control condition (M = 2.50, SD = .48), t(18) = 3.31, p =
.004.
Procedure & Measures
Similar to Study One, participants were greeted by an experimenter and told that
they would be participating in a study on personality and games. Again, up to six
participants attended a session at one time, seated at individual computer cubicles. After
the experimenter obtained informed consent, the participants were randomly assigned to
either the experimental (mindfulness) or control condition. All participants in one
session were assigned to the same condition to maintain a consistent environment and
avoid potential distractions. Both conditions received 15 minutes of pre-recorded
instructions that they listened to on individual headphones.
Immediately following the instructional period, all participants completed most of
the measures from Study One, again administered via computer using Inquisit and
MediaLab. First, the PANAS was used to assess any post-induction differences in mood
state between the two conditions and as a potential correlate with the BeanFest measures.
Next, participants played the BeanFest game as it was described in Study One. The
BeanFest indices served as the primary dependent measures. State anxiety, which could
be related to performance in BeanFest and/or an alternate explanation for results, was
then measured, followed by measures of cognitive style. The cognitive style measures
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served as secondary dependent variables, given that the duration of the induced mindful
state was unknown. State anxiety was assessed using the state subscale of the STAI. The
measures of cognitive style included the DAS, LMSQ, and FES. Participants completed
a measure of trait mindfulness, the MAAS, and the same demographic questions used in
Study One, so that any differences between groups on these measures could be
statistically controlled for (or further investigated) if warranted. Additionally, four
questions were used to assess the extent to which the participant complied with the
manipulation and BeanFest instructions. The two questions concerning manipulation
compliance were: “To what extent did you follow the instructions during the audio
recording at the beginning of this study?” and “How difficult or easy was it to follow the
instructions during the audio recording?” which were correlated, r(111) = .37, p < .001.
The two questions for BeanFest compliance were: “To what extent did you follow the
instructions during the BeanFest game?” and “To what extent did you try to learn if the
beans were helpful or harmful based on their appearance (their shape and/or speckles)?”
which also were correlated, r(111) = .44, p < .001. Participants indicated their responses
using 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Completely), except for the
second manipulation question that ranged from 1 (Difficult) to 5 (Easy). Composite
scores were created for manipulation compliance and BeanFest compliance by summing
the scores for the two questions that pertained to each form of compliance. Trait
measures of depression or anxiety were not expected to be affected by the brief induction.
Hence, these trait measures were excluded. After completing the study procedures,
participants were fully debriefed, thanked and dismissed.
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Results
Preliminary Analyses
Initial inspections of the data revealed five outliers: two for the NA subscale of
the PANAS, one for the LMSQ, and two for the Optimism subscale of the FES.
Comparisons of the 5% trimmed mean to the overall mean for each of these variables
determined that these values significantly affected the mean, so they were excluded.
After excluding these values, the distributions for all variables were acceptably normal.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations and ranges, for all
variables of interest can be found in Table 4. Measures of central tendency and
variability for the affective, cognitive style, and mindfulness measures for the full sample
again were consistent with previous findings.
For the BeanFest data for the full sample, the mean phi coefficient (indicating
learning) was .21 (SD =.29), which was significantly different from zero, t(112) = 7.96, p
< .001, indicating that overall the participants did learn and perhaps slightly better than in
Study One. The overall percent of positive beans correct (M =.61, SD =.17) and percent
of negative beans correct (M =.60, SD =.20) both were significantly greater than chance
(50 percent), t(112) = 6.59, p < .001 for percent positive correct and t(112) = 5.34, p <
.001 for percent negative correct. The learning asymmetry (the difference between
percents positive and negative correct) was -.01 (SD = .24), which a t-test showed to be
equivalent to a zero difference, t(112) = -.39, p = .697. The mean generalization
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asymmetry of .06 (SD = .29) was significantly different from zero, t(112) = 2.18, p =
.031, indicating an overall negativity bias in generalization.
Table 4
Means, standard deviations, and ranges for all variables of interest (Study 2)
Variable
BeanFest indices
Learning
Percent positive correct
Percent negative correct
Learning asymmetry
Generalization asymmetry
Cognitive style measures
DAS
LMSQ
FES – Optimism subscale
FES – Pessimism subscale
Affect measures
PANAS – positive affect subscale
PANAS – negative affect subscale
STAI – state subscale
Mindfulness measures
MAAS

Mean

SD

Range

.21
.61
.60
-.01
.06

.29
.17
.20
.24
.29

1.24
.83
.78
1.53
1.87

118.58
55.93
27.76
-1.21

28.77
9.01
16.06
17.75

162
45
80.00
95.00

28.24
15.14
40.31

7.95
5.41
11.66

40.00
26.00
56

3.51

.76

4.00

Tests of Confounds
T-tests were used to examine if the conditions differed on trait mindfulness and
state affect. This was important to rule out these variables as potential alternate
explanations. The conditions did not differ on trait mindfulness, t(111) = .019, p = .985.
The conditions also did not differ on state affect as measured by the PANAS [for PA,
t(111) = -1.44, p = .152; for NA, t(111) = 1.01, p = .317] and the STAI (state subscale
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only) [t(111) = 1.30, p = .196]. The groups also did not differ on any demographic
variables (ps > .30).
Tests of Covariates
Zero-order correlations were computed to examine if BeanFest compliance and
state affect were related to learning and generalization in BeanFest, the dependent
measures in the tests of the primary hypothesis. Unsurprisingly, BeanFest compliance
was significantly correlated with learning, r(111) = .32, p < .001, percent negative
correct, r(111) = .41, p < .001, and generalization asymmetry, r(111) = .37, p < .001.
Learning also correlated with state affect; specifically, there was a positive correlation
with the PA subscale of the PANAS, r(111) = .23, p = .013, and an inverse correlation
with the STAI, r(111) = -.29, p = .002. The generalization asymmetry also inversely
correlated with the STAI, r(111) = -.22, p = .021. Based on these correlations, BeanFest
compliance and state affect (positive affect and state anxiety) were controlled for in tests
of the primary hypothesis.7 Manipulation compliance also was controlled for based on
the theoretical justification that greater compliance should produce greater effects, and
vice-versa.
In the tests of the secondary hypotheses in which the cognitive style measures
served as dependent variables, the analyses controlled for manipulation compliance and
state affect (as measured by the NA subscale of the PANAS and the STAI) because these
variables were correlated with the dependent variables (see Table 5 for the correlations).

7

PANAS scores were not controlled for when testing for effects on generalization asymmetry because no
correlations were found between these measures.
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Table 5
Correlations between manipulation compliance, affect, and cognitive style measures
(Study 2)
1
--

2
--

3
--

4
--

5
--

6
--

7
--

2. PANAS – positive
affect subscale

.20*

--

--

--

--

--

--

3. PANAS –
negative affect
subscale

-.16†

.03

--

--

--

--

--

4. STAI
5. DAS
6. LMSQ
7. FES – pessimism
subscale

-.21*
-.26**
-.17†
-.24*

-.38**
-.08
-.07
-.13

.51**
.40**
.21*
.30**

-.40**
.32**
.36**

--.34**
.44**

---.18†

-----

8. FES – optimism
subscale

.26**

.24*

-.09

-.34**

-.23*

-.23*

-.26**

1. Manipulation
compliance

†

p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Tests of Primary Hypothesis
A 2 (mindfulness or control condition) x 2 (positive or negative bean valence)
factorial ANCOVA was used to analyze the effect of condition and bean valence on
percent learned correctly, while controlling for both composite measures of instructional
compliance (manipulation and BeanFest) as well as state affect (PA and STAI) to ensure
that effects of these variables were minimized.8 There was no main effect of condition,

8

Assumption testing for the ANCOVAs confirmed homogeneity of the regression slopes for the covariates,
meaning that they did not interact significantly with the independent variables in their relationships to the
dependent variable. The covariates also did not demonstrate multicollinearity with each other.
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F(1, 107) = .85, p = .360. Participants in the mindfulness condition did not correctly
identify more beans than the participants in the control condition. There also was not a
main effect of valence, Wilks Lambda = .99, F (1, 107) = .06, p = .814. As previously
reported, there was not an overall learning asymmetry. However, as hypothesized, there
was a significant interaction between condition and valence on the percent correct, Wilks
Lambda = .963, F(1, 107) = 4.07, p = .046, partial eta squared = .037. The interaction is
depicted in Figure 3. The adjusted mean learning asymmetry in the control condition was
.04 (negatively biased) and in the mindfulness condition it was -.06 (positively biased).
To investigate this interaction further, one-way ANCOVAs were run comparing the
conditions on percent positive correct and percent negative correct. The conditions
significantly differed on percent negative correct, F(1, 107) = 4.17, p = .044. The
adjusted means revealed that the mindfulness condition (M = .56, SE =.02) developed
fewer negative attitudes than the control condition (M = .64, SE =.02). No significant
differences between the conditions were found for percent positive correct, F(1, 107) =
.42, p = .517.
A one-way ANCOVA was then used to test if the generalization asymmetry
differed by condition, controlling for instructional compliance and state anxiety as well as
learning (to assess bias beyond that accounted for by learning). The difference between
the conditions was marginally significant, F(1, 107) = 3.30, p = .072. The control
condition (adjusted M = .11, SE = .04) demonstrated more negativity bias in
generalization than the mindfulness condition (adjusted M =.01, SE = .04). The mean

Additionally, homogeneity of variances was tested using Levene‟s test and homogeneity of
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generalization asymmetry in the control condition differed significantly from zero [t(56)
= 2.68, p = .010], whereas the generalization asymmetry in the mindfulness condition
was essentially the same as a zero difference [t(55) = .56, p = .581].

0.80
0.75

Percent correct

0.70
0.65
0.60

Positive

0.55

Negative

0.50
0.45
0.40

Mindfulness

Control

Figure 3. Interaction between condition and valence on percent correct in BeanFest
(Study 2)

Tests of Secondary Hypothesis
One-way ANCOVAs were used to examine if the cognitive style measures
differed by condition, controlling for effects of manipulation compliance and state affect
(state anxiety and negative affect for the DAS, LMSQ, FES Pessimism; state anxiety and
positive affect for the FES Optimism). The conditions did not significantly differ on the
DAS [F(1, 106) = .18, p = .675], the LMSQ [F(1, 105) = .55, p = .461], or the Pessimism
subscale of the FES [F(1, 106) = .03, p = .854]. However, the conditions did differ
significantly on the Optimism subscale of the FES, F(1, 106) = 6.07, p = .015. The
intercorrelations was tested using Box‟s M; neither test was significant.
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mindfulness condition (adjusted M = 31.44; SD = 2.04) demonstrated greater optimism
than the control condition (adjusted M = 24.14, SD = 2.02).
Correlations
Correlations between trait mindfulness and the negative cognitive style measures
were determined to examine if they replicated those found in Study One. Similar, albeit
somewhat stronger, inverse relationships to those in Study One were found between the
MAAS and the DAS, LMSQ, and the Pessimism subscale of the FES (rs = -.44, -.36, .36, respectively; all ps < .001).
Discussion
The aim of Study Two was to test for a causal relationship between mindfulness
and reduced negativity bias. The primary hypothesis was that a mindfulness induction,
compared to a control condition, would result in less negativity bias in attitude formation
and generalization as measured in BeanFest. This was supported by the results.
However, it was originally hypothesized that mindfulness would reduce bias overall,
which would produce more equal learning and generalization of positive and negative
valences rather than reversing to a positivity bias. Yet, the results of Study One raised
the possibility that mindfulness might produce a positivity bias. For learning, or attitude
formation, in Study Two a positivity bias was indeed found: The mindfulness condition
formed more positive attitudes relative to negative attitudes as compared to the control
condition. Inconsistent with Study One findings, the positivity bias for more mindful
participants was due to decreased learning of negative game beans, not increased learning
of positive game beans. A potential explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that the
59

mindfulness induction might have been taxing for novices and thus dampened their
learning of positive and negatives. That is, perhaps learning benefits from the
mindfulness induction were offset by the effort of the induction. Overall level of learning
did not differ between conditions in Study Two, but in Study One learning – and
specifically positive learning – increased with mindfulness. If the participants in the
mindfulness condition had been less taxed, perhaps positive attitude formation would
have been more pronounced and account more for the positivity bias. This or other
differences between trait mindfulness and the brief induction could account for the results
in the two studies.
In any case, for attitude generalization, the results trended toward indicating that
neither a positivity nor negativity bias was evident for the mindfulness condition,
whereas a negativity bias was evident for the control condition. These results seem to
suggest that when an object was associated with a definite valence, mindfulness increased
attention to and learning of positives over negatives. However, when an object was not
definitely associated with a valence, mindfulness decreased bias and led to a more
egalitarian approach of categorizing novel targets.
A tentative, secondary hypothesis was that the mindfulness induction would
produce less negativity bias on measures of cognitive style when compared to the control
condition. For all measures of negative cognitive style, there were no differences
between the conditions. It was proposed earlier that the duration of the mindfulness
induction‟s effects might have been too short to affect these measures. Yet, the
mindfulness condition showed higher levels of optimism than the control condition. It is
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unlikely that the two conditions differed on optimism prior to the induction because they
did not differ on any other measure of cognitive style or affect with which optimism
correlates. It is possible that the brief mindfulness induction affected only the measure of
positivity and not the self-report measures of negativity. Perhaps changes on these
measures of negative cognitive style require more training or time to emerge. Trait
mindfulness correlated inversely with the measures of negative cognitive style, as in
Study One, but based on this research it is uncertain whether mindfulness would cause
changes in these measures of negative cognitive style.
One might wonder why the mindfulness condition reported a more positive
outlook on the optimism measure but did not generalize positive attitudes in BeanFest.
Perhaps although the concept of optimism involves generalized positive expectancies, the
specific scale used here is more similar to the attitude formation task because it involves
potential scenarios with pre-defined valences that participants have learned from prior
experience. That is, they are asked to rate the likelihood that they will experience various
events which are clearly positive in valence. Thus, this scale seems to measure emphasis
placed on known positives, which is more similar to the attitude formation task than the
attitude generalization task. The latter differs in that the stimuli to be categorized are
novel, albeit similar in appearance to previous stimuli, and participants do not receive any
indication of their valence. If the optimism scale is more similar to the attitude formation
task, then this reinforces the idea that being more mindful caused participants to give
more weight to known positives over known negatives but not to extend this bias to
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unknown stimuli. This indicates that mindfulness may reduce generalization of the
valence of a known target to a similar but novel target.
Because the conditions did not differ on measures of state affect and the analyses
controlled for those measures based on their relationships with the dependent variables,
neither affective valence nor arousal can account for the above findings. The results are
also compelling considering that the study‟s power was limited by not reaching the target
sample size. Controlling for instructional compliance helped to increase power by
reducing error variance related to motivational issues and other reasons for reduced
compliance which may have plagued Study One.
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CHAPTER 4 General Discussion
The current research proposed and tested the general hypothesis that mindfulness
reduces bias, specifically negativity bias, and that this may at least partially explain why
mindfulness reduces or prevents emotional distress.
The goal of Study One was to establish correlational evidence to support the
proposed association between trait mindfulness and reduced negativity bias in attitude
formation and generalization as well as on measures of negative cognitive style.
Additionally, the proposed mediational role of these reduced negativity biases in the
inverse relationship between trait mindfulness and predisposition to depression and
anxiety was tested. Trait mindfulness was associated with better learning of stimuli
during the BeanFest game and, more specifically, forming a greater number of positive
attitudes. Trait mindfulness also was inversely related to measures of negatively biased
attitudes and attributions, indicating that those who were more mindful reported less
negatively biased cognitions. Further, this lower negativity bias partially accounted for
the inverse relationship between trait mindfulness and emotional distress (as indicated by
depression and anxiety inventories). Thus, the findings from Study One supported the
initial contentions that those who are more mindful are less negatively biased in their
cognitive content, and that this contributes to their lower levels of emotional distress.
However, the unexpected association between mindfulness and positive attitude
formation and trait optimism raised the possibility that mindfulness was associated with
less negativity bias not because of a relative lack of bias (i.e., equivalence in attention to
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and appreciation of positive and negative information) but because of a bias in the
opposite direction – toward positivity.
Study Two built on these findings using a randomized, controlled experimental
design to test for causality. Participants completed either a mindfulness induction or a
control exercise, and then they completed measures of attitude formation and
generalization followed by measures of negative cognitive style. Overall learning did not
differ by condition, meaning that participants learned essentially the same number of
stimuli. However, participants in the mindfulness condition formed more positive
attitudes than negative attitudes whereas the reverse was true for participants in the
control condition. Given that a full feedback version of the BeanFest game was utilized,
participants in the two conditions seemed to weight the positive and negative information
differently. Those in the mindfulness condition also reported significantly more optimism
than those in the control condition; that is, they perceived a higher likelihood that they
would experience various positive events in the future. These findings suggest that
mindfulness caused participants to be biased toward positivity, rather than less biased as
initially proposed. However, this apparent positivity bias may only apply to stimuli with
a defined valence, considering that a marginally significant trend indicated that
participants in the mindfulness condition did not demonstrate bias, either positive or
negative, when generalizing attitudes to novel, ambiguous stimuli (whereas the control
condition demonstrated a negativity bias). Together, these findings provide initial
evidence suggesting that mindfulness may create a bias toward recognizably positive
stimuli without producing bias when encountering unknown stimuli.
64

It should be noted that in Study Two, the mindfulness induction did not affect
scores on the measures of negative cognitive style. However, in both studies trait
mindfulness was inversely associated with these measures. With correlational findings,
there is the potential for bi-directional relationships and effects from third variables.
Thus, the precise nature of the association between the variables is not truly known. Still,
the mindfulness induction did reduce negativity bias in both attitude formation and
generalization, which supports the possibility that mindfulness does reduce negativity
bias. Potentially, the brief induction of mindfulness was not strong or long enough to
affect the measures of pre-existing negative cognitions, which were administered at the
end of the sessions. Indeed, Ramel and colleagues (2004) found that an eight-week
mindfulness training did lead to improvements in dysfunctional attitudes. This provides
some evidence that mindfulness can affect pre-existing negative cognitions with longer
training. Perhaps similar positive cognitions can be affected more easily by a brief
mindfulness training, and this could explain why scores on the measure of optimism were
affected by the induction. It is conceivable that mindfulness primarily affects weighting
of positive information and that this leads to changes in negative cognitions over time.
The present findings cannot be explained by state affect, including calmness or
positive affect. State affect was controlled for in the various analyses, and the
mindfulness manipulation in Study Two did not result in differences in affect as
measured by the PANAS or STAI between the two conditions (mindfulness versus
control). Moreover, participants in Study Two were randomly assigned to conditions, so
individual differences such as trait mindfulness and demographics were distributed
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evenly between the groups. Given that the manipulation and measures were administered
using pre-recorded instructions and through a computer program, respectively, any
unintentional experimenter demand effects were minimized.
Connections with Previous Research
The findings from this research concur with and build on previous studies related
to mindfulness and bias. As far as negativity bias, the inverse relationship between trait
mindfulness and dysfunctional attitudes is in accord with Ramel and colleagues‟ (2004)
finding that a mindfulness-based intervention (MBSR) reduced dysfunctional attitudes.
The current research added to such findings by demonstrating that trait mindfulness also
was inversely related to pessimism and the looming maladaptive cognitive style, and that
a brief mindfulness induction reduced the formation and generalization of negative
attitudes. The consistency of the findings across the present two studies and with
previous research supports the contention that mindfulness can reduce negativity bias.
Importantly, this is also the first study to test and find that less negatively biased
cognition partially mediates the inverse relationship between mindfulness and emotional
distress.
An intriguing new finding of the current research was a causal link between
mindfulness and positivity bias. Previous correlational research has linked trait
mindfulness with higher levels of optimism (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003). The current
studies replicated this finding, and extended such research by showing that a brief
mindfulness induction caused an increase in optimism. Of more interest and significance
are the relations found between mindfulness and the BeanFest indices. The positivity
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biases found with BeanFest are most striking because the attitude formation measure has
not been used previously with mindfulness measures or inductions. Also, the advantage
of this specific measure is that it provides a clean, objective standard of the valence of
stimuli. That is, stimuli have a set positive, negative, or unspecified valence to which
participants‟ responses are compared. There is no interpretation or subjective assessment
as to the extremity or valence of the stimuli. Thus, the positivity bias in the mindfulness
conditions means indicates a true ratio of how positives were weighted compared to
negatives.
Why a Positivity Bias?
Originally, it was proposed that mindfulness would reduce bias overall rather than
promote a bias toward positivity. However, in both studies, mindfulness was related to a
bias toward learning positive valences. This raises questions about why mindfulness
might increase positivity bias, particularly after a brief induction of mindfulness. That is,
it was not a choice or change that developed over time. Although a relatively small
number of studies exist on the effects of mindfulness-like inductions, they may be most
informative to the present research. The induction used here was similar to that used by
Arch and Craske (2006), who found that participants who completed the induction
reported less negative emotion in response to negatively valenced pictures as compared to
control conditions. They also were more willing to view aversive pictures. These
findings were interpreted as evidence of reduced emotional reactivity or faster recovery.
Similar conclusions have been drawn from other, related induction studies (e.g. Eifert &
Heffner, 2003; Levitt et al., 2004), as mentioned previously. It was argued here
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previously that the emotional reactivity explanation is somewhat questionable because
mindfulness-related inductions also have been found to maintain or even increase
sensitivity to the valence of experiences in the moment (e.g., Cioffi & Holloway, 1993;
LeBel & Dubé, 2001). However, another possible explanation is faster recovery. All of
the induction studies mentioned here that used negative stimuli showed evidence of
increased acceptance and faster recovery. It is possible that mindfulness enables
individuals to register and then disengage from negative stimuli faster, reducing the
attentional, cognitive, and/or emotional weight that such stimuli would otherwise
produce. Indeed, Ortner and colleagues (2007) found that individuals trained in
mindfulness disengaged from unpleasant pictures faster than control participants,
although their study used a longer mindfulness training. Perhaps this ability frees
conscious resources to process positive information.
It is also interesting to consider that mindfulness might increase sensitivity to
rewards. LeBel and Dubé (2001) found that a sensory monitoring induction (akin to
being mindful of sensations), compared to a distraction condition, increased reported
pleasure while eating chocolate. Another study (Kiken & Brown, 2008) similarly found
that a sensory monitoring induction, compared to distraction and control conditions,
increased reported enjoyment while tasting raisins. The valences in the BeanFest
paradigm are related to reward (gaining points) or punishment (losing points), and
learning to associate the stimuli with the correct consequence. If mindfulness increases
sensitivity to the rewarding nature of positive stimuli, while enabling disengagement
from aversive stimuli, then perhaps this explains why the mindfulness induction caused
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participants to learn the valence of positive beans better. In other words, gaining points
was more enjoyable than losing points and the mindfulness induction may have enabled
participants to distribute cognitive resources accordingly.
Yet, the extent of the positivity bias produced by mindfulness in this research
appeared to be limited to those stimuli with a clearly defined valence. For
categorizations of novel, ambiguous stimuli, the mindfulness induction trended toward
reducing negativity bias without reversing to a positivity bias. Mindfulness seemed to
reduce bias overall. Given that the participants received no information about the valence
of these stimuli, indicating an equal likelihood of positive or negative valence (as the
mindfulness condition tended to do) was a more accurate response. That said, the
unknown stimuli were similar in appearance to the clearly valenced stimuli to which
participants were previously exposed. It is remarkable that the mindfulness condition
essentially distinguished the new, ambiguous stimuli from the valenced stimuli that they
had just learned beforehand, particularly given that they categorized 100 total beans.
This supports the idea that mindfulness is more attuned to present experiences and that it
can produce less bias when the potential valence of a stimulus is unclear. Brown and
colleagues (2007) contend that “When mindful … thoughts are less likely to be colored
by beliefs, prejudices and other biases that are not supported by objective or experiential
evidence” (p. 213). Accordingly, a lack of evidence of a valence associated with a
stimulus should reduce bias in thoughts about that stimulus when individuals are being
more mindful. That is what appears to have been found here in terms of positive and
negative evaluations. Another way to phrase this is that mindfulness appeared to reduce
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overgeneralization of both positive and negative attitudes. This is important to consider,
as many biases including those in emotional disorders involve generalizing negativity
from something that is actually negative to something similar that is not necessarily
negative (e.g., Alloy et al., 2000; 2006).
Likewise, the present findings, although preliminary, have implications for
multiple aspects of emotional distress and disorder. First, a reason that mindfulness
reduces rumination (Ramel et al., 2004; Jain et al., 2007) could be that negativity is not
generalized beyond the actual source. Further, less weight may be given to clearly
negative experiences and more weight may be given to clearly positive experiences.
With both of these processes, there might be less to ruminate about. This exemplifies
how mindfulness may affect thought content by altering the mental context. Receptive,
present-moment attention may reduce generalization, which may be aided by or a result
of the reduced elaboration on thoughts and feelings described by Segal and colleagues
(2002). They also suggested that reduced elaboration could help shift cognitive resources
away from known negatives, accepting them and letting them go, to known positives,
which could be accepted and appreciated more. For those who increase their exposure to
or level of mindfulness over time, pre-existing negatively biased cognitions might be
reduced as the study by Ramel and colleagues (2004) found for dysfunctional attitudes.
When negative cognitions do arise, they may be recovered from more easily, receiving
less emphasis and generalizing less.
This aligns with explanations of how mindfulness-based interventions such as
MBCT may prevent the recurrence of depression and reduce anxiety, as well as with
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traditional cognitive theories of these disorders. Recall that the aims of mindfulnessbased interventions relate to cognitive context whereas the aims of CT involve cognitive
content, despite the potential that both approaches could conceivably affect context and
content. It was proposed earlier, based on schema modification models described by
Hollon and colleagues (1993), that the process of each approach may differ.
Mindfulness-based interventions may deactivate negatively biased schemas (by reducing
elaboration) and reinforce compensatory schemas (receptively attending to present events
and experiences). CT may engage and directly change negatively biased schemas so that
they accommodate other perspectives and beliefs. This may be a more active cognitive
process that involves evaluating thoughts and therefore more cognitive elaboration than
mindfulness-based approaches. It was proposed that the context of mindfulness could
result in cognitive changes without actively engaging and testing cognitions, because
mindfulness itself might entail a less biased approach. The current findings suggest that
this could be at least partly true. Mindfulness did change thought content in the current
research, for attitude formation and generalization as well as the perceived likelihood of
positive events occurring, without any active effort or aim to change thoughts. Thoughts
either became more positive than negative, or less biased toward either valence,
depending on whether the task involved defined or ambiguous valences. According to
CT, such cognitive changes facilitate improvements in depression and anxiety (Garratt et
al., 2007). Thus, even though mindfulness-based approaches do not focus on cognitive
content, changes in cognitive content may be key to the effectiveness of these
approaches. At the same time, they may add to traditional CT by teaching a mental skill
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that reduces the need to actively engage in cognitive restructuring. Of course, these are
speculations on the implications of the current findings as they relate to existing theory
and research on therapeutic interventions, so they require more empirical validation.
Limitations
While many compelling implications and questions arise from the current
findings, there are limitations to this research. First, the operationalizations of
mindfulness should be considered. The mindfulness induction in Study Two was a 15minute training with novices. Thus, it may have only approximated a mindful state. A
fuller or truer state of mindfulness might have produced different results, which may
account for inconsistencies between the two studies (e.g., mindfulness correlating with
increased learning of positive game beans in Study One, whereas the mindfulness
condition differed in learning of negative game beans in Study Two). Still, it is
interesting and powerful that the brief induction with novices had the effects that it did.
It also should be noted that Study One relied on two self-report measures of trait
mindfulness, and some disagreement does exist over which, if any, of the self-report
scales best assess the construct. However, both scales used have been tested for validity
and reliability, and the MAAS has been especially well-tested and widely used compared
to other mindfulness scales. Further, non-self-report measures of mindfulness have not
been definitively established.
Because Study One was cross-sectional, the meditation model was not tested with
data that could account for temporal order as would be possible with longitudinal data.
Although reduced negativity bias partially accounted for the inverse correlation between
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trait mindfulness and emotional distress, it was not demonstrated that mindfulness
preceded cognitive changes or that cognitive changes preceded emotional distress
outcomes. One might contend that reduced emotional distress accounts for changes in
cognition. In Study Two, mindfulness did not produce significant differences in affect
and still reduced negativity bias on certain cognitive measures, although it did not reduce
negativity bias on the cognitive style measures used in the meditational analyses in Study
One. It has been proposed here based on a previous study that longer training may be
needed to produce changes on the cognitive style measures. Additionally, previous
longitudinal and experimental studies do support that changes in negatively biased
cognitions precede improvements in symptoms of depression and anxiety (Alloy et al.,
2000, 2006; Garratt et al., 2007). Thus, the mediation model tested in Study One has
some justification and provides a testable framework for future research.
Generalizability of the current findings should also be considered. First, the
undergraduate samples, although diverse, may not necessarily represent the typical adult
population. They were not clinical samples, either, so the results here might not
generalize to clinical populations. Additionally, the BeanFest paradigm is a simple, static
world whereas real life is complex and dynamic. However, the aim of these studies was
to demonstrate that mindfulness could reduce bias, and the BeanFest paradigm provided a
clear, objective measure of this. Similarly, generalizability to certain populations was not
a main concern of this research because it aimed to provide an initial experimental test of
a basic research question, to provide a basis for future studies that can better address
generalizability and applied relevance.
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However, the Study One sample was of some concern as far as overall levels of
motivation or comprehension of some of the BeanFest instructions. Based on the
relatively low levels of learning in BeanFest and anecdotal reports from experimenters of
low motivation, this may explain the failure to replicate past correlations between the
BeanFest measures and the measures of cognitive style and emotional disorders. The
undergraduate population at this university may differ from the undergraduate
populations used in previous studies with BeanFest, either in terms of their motivation or
other factors. Study Two attempted to account for this to some degree by asking
participants to report honestly on their compliance with the manipulation and BeanFest.
More research is being planned to investigate potential differences in the populations and
to increase motivation and instructional clarity.
Future Directions
Future research is needed to replicate the current findings, as they are preliminary
despite the various potential explanations and implications posed here. Replications
could use other samples and incorporate additional or different measures of negativity
and positivity biases. Longitudinal research would be helpful for examining the effects
of longer mindfulness training on cognitive biases and to test the temporal order of the
variables in the mediation model.
If the positivity bias is replicated in future research, more research should
investigate its scope and potential mechanisms behind it (e.g., increased attention to
positives versus decreased attention to negatives). As mentioned earlier, fatigue may
mask effects of mindfulness inductions in novices, so this could be investigated and
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controlled for in future studies. It also could be revealing to test if mindfulness increases
learning through positive reinforcement. Further, it could be helpful to measure
positivity bias along with recovery or disengagement from negative stimuli, to see if the
latter plays a role in the former.
The potential for a lack of bias should continue to be investigated as well. The
current research suggests that mindfulness may reduce bias toward novel, ambiguous
targets. This should be replicated with multiple forms of stimuli. Research could also
investigate if and how mindfulness affects the ability to discriminate between familiar
stimuli of a defined valence and similar but new stimuli of an undefined valence.
Conclusion
The present research was a preliminary step in testing for causal links between
mindfulness and bias. Mindfulness was found to reduce negativity bias, and this may
partially explain why mindfulness reduces emotional distress. Surprisingly, mindfulness
also produced a positivity bias on measures of attitude formation and optimism – tasks
with clearly valenced stimuli. It also appeared that mindfulness reduced bias overall in
generalizing attitudes to ambiguous stimuli. The findings may have important
implications for how mindfulness contributes to psychological well-being, as well as how
individuals perceive and interpret their broader social worlds.
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